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Abstract 
Rational expectations do not require beliefs to be consistent with history and with what agents can 
conclude from it. Actually, at a rational expectations equilibrium agents may hold beliefs that explain 
poorly the history they observe, even when restricted to only those rationalizing their choices. This 
paper shows that if agents hold rationally formed expectations instead —in the sense of following from 
beliefs that explain history better than any other beliefs justifying their choices— then additional 
allocations unsupported by rational expectations can be shown to be equilibrium outcomes. By means 
of this result, it is established too that adding common knowledge of the rationality of the formation of 
expectations —on top of that of rationality of choices and market clearing— does not suffice either to 
guarantee rational expectations. Interestingly, the rationally formed expectations equilibria produced in 
this paper exhibit a sunspot-like volatility that do not rely on an explicit sunspot mechanism. 
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1. Introduction
Agents make depend their decisions on their expectations about anything that may
have an impact on their consequences, namely the other agents’ current and future
plans of action, and current and past actual events.1 Whether expectations are
rational and whether they are rationally formed are related but essentially distinct
issues. What is a rational way of forming expectations depends on what these expec-
tations are about. While in strategic situations common knowledge of rationality
can guide an agent in the formation of his expectations about the other agents’
plans,2 when it comes to expectations about future events a competing source of
information to build expectations rationally (and the only one if the relevant events
are only about states of nature and not past behaviors) is empirical evidence from
the past. Thus, in the absence of a strategic dimension —as in, for instance, com-
petitive markets— only history carries weight in forming expectations rationally.
Bearing this in mind, we would expect rational agents to hold expectations that
follow from theories or beliefs that explain best the past they observe. Indeed, that
an agent may have made a decision because of beliefs distinct from those that ex-
plain best the history he or she observes amounts to assume that that agent does
not infer rationally from evidence, and must therefore be rejected on the grounds
of the agent’s rationality.
Does not the rational expectations hypothesis settle the issue? No, in fact the
rational expectations hypothesis itself is silent about the formation of expectations:3
(i) in sequential markets models it just forbids the agents to hold expectations that
lead to systematic forecasting mistakes; (ii) in the general equilibrium literature
it requires the agents’ choices to be contingent only to the information available,
including the information revealed by prices. At any rate, nothing prevents that in a
rational expectations equilibrium an agent holds expectations following from beliefs
that do not explain best the history he observes, not even among only those that
rationalize his choice.4 Thus, if empirical evidence is the only source of information
1This may include, on top of those of nature, the history of past actual actions by everyone.
2As a matter of fact, although a popular assumption, common knowledge of rationality is un-
necessarily strong to underpin Nash equilibria: individual rationality and mutual knowledge of
everybody else’s strategy suffices —see Aumann and Brandemburger (1995).
3Lucas (1978) agues, nonetheless, that rational expectations equilibria are the asymptotic result
of Bayesian learning or boundedly rational learning processes. Lucas (1986) quotes Bray (1982,
1983) and by Blume and Easley (1982) along this line. Ben Porath and Heifetz (2010) have spelled
out the framework needed to state and prove such a claim.
4More precisely, a rational expectations equilibrium needs not impute agents, as their subjective
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on which agents rationally form their beliefs about a (non-strategic) environment,
then rational expectations need not be rationally formed.
This paper proposes instead an equilibrium concept that requires the agents’ expec-
tations to follow from beliefs that are not worse at explaining the available evidence
than any other beliefs rationalizing his choice. Since this is a condition on what
is going on inside the agents’ minds when making a choice, should it make no dif-
ference outside people’s minds, such condition would be irrelevant, but the fact is
that (as it will be shown below) it does matter for the determination of what can
be an equilibrium outcome and what cannot. Interestingly, with this equilibrium
notion, new instances of sunspot-like volatility of prices and trades that cannot be
supported as rational expectations equilibria happen to be, nonetheless, equilibrium
outcomes.
As a matter of fact, the results of this paper contribute also to the literature seek-
ing to provide a common knowledge foundation to competitive equilibrium out-
comes. Specifically, the result above allows to establish that, in sequential market
economies, adding to the common knowledge of rationality and market clearing also
the common knowledge of rationality in the way agents form their expectations is
still not enough to guarantee a rational expectations equilibrium outcome (that ra-
tional expectations equilibria outcomes need not follow from common knowledge of
just rationality and market clearing has been established in Ben-Porath and Heifetz
(2010) for finite exchange economies with asymmetric information; Morris (1994)
had shown that common knowledge of rationality and market clearing imply ratio-
nal expectations equilibria only if the agents share a common prior on the set of
states of the world —which includes the whole system of beliefs and higher order
beliefs, on top of the state of nature— an admittedly too demanding assumption).
More specifically, I consider a deterministic overlapping generations exchange econ-
omy of agents that hold rationally formed expectations in the sense that any other
expectations consistent with their choices follow from beliefs implying a smaller
likelihood for the history they observe.5 I argue first that a belief that the observed
probabilities, the asymptotic value of the maximum likelihood estimate of the probabilities of the
transitions (consistent with the optimality of the choices made) that they observe, which, from
an admittedly frequentist viewpoint, is unsatisfactory since the maximum likelihood estimator
achieves the Crame´r-Rao lower bound for the asymptotic mean squared error among unbiased
estimators, while any other estimator converging to a rational-expectations limit does not.
5Very importantly, note that this is not to say that each agent forms his expectations maximizing
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history is Markovian can never be falsified when the agents’ memory (or the history
itself) is finite. Then, for Markovian beliefs I establish that when the agents’ mem-
ories are finite there exist rationally formed expectations equilibria that no rational
expectations equilibrium can match (Proposition 2).
It is worth noticing that limited memory and communication between agents are es-
sential for the existence of rationally formed expectations equilibria distinct from a
rational expectations equilibrium. In effect, with infinite memory the only existing
rationally formed expectations equilibria would be allocationally equivalent to some
rational expectations equilibrium (Proposition 1). Instead, with limited memory,
different agents can hold different expectations at a rationally formed expectations
equilibrium, since this diversity of beliefs follows from the fact that different gen-
erations observe different bits of the same history and therefore form their beliefs
using different information —the limited memory itself captures the bounded com-
puting abilities of actual agents. Thus, in spite of the result in Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982) showing that unrestricted communication allows agents with
a common prior but different information to agree in finite time on a common pos-
terior,6 the limited communication friction implied the demographic structure of
the economy (as a sequence of overlapping generations) allows for the agents to
disagree.
Specifically, a rationally formed expectations equilibrium will consist, for each agent
in each generation and for each history of prices he may observe, of (1) a belief that
the prices follow a particular stochastic process, and (2) consumption decisions
(contingent to future prices for future consumptions), such that, for any history of
prices up to any date, (i) the allocation is feasible, (ii) the agents’ consumptions
maximize their expected utilities given the price process they believe they face, and
(iii) the agents’ beliefs about the price process are formed rationally —i.e. their
beliefs are not falsified by history and attach to the latter a likelihood not smaller
than any other beliefs justifying their choices.
the likelihood of observed history, since expectations must justify the agent’s choice. As a matter
of fat, rationally formed expectations typically do not maximize the unconstrained likelihood of
observed history because of this latter condition. The actual formation of expectations itself is left
un-modeled here, but the rationality condition introduced does restrict the expectations formation
process nonetheless.
6The posterior needs not be the result from pooling all the information, even though this discrep-
ancy happens only in unlikely situations with a ”high degree of symmetry” (see Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982)).
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Note that the equilibrium concept leaves open the question of how the actual his-
tory of prices is determined. The equilibrium concept just requires that it does not
falsify the agents’ beliefs. Therefore, no objective process is assumed here to drive
prices and, as a consequence, there is no room for agents to mistake a price process
they supposedly face —which would be the ultimate rationality test under rational
expectations. In case not specifying such process may be disconcerting, it is impor-
tant to note that, in the absence of shocks to the fundamentals (which is the case
considered in this paper), assuming that some objective stochastic process like the
one followed by a sunspot signal drives the prices, amounts to postulate implicitly
a particular price formation theory —extraneous to the equilibrium conditions and
hence alien to market-clearing forces— that acts in an ad hoc way as a selecting
device within the set of possible price processes.7 Given the obvious difficulties in
justifying the causation from sunspots all the way to prices and, more importantly,
given that it is superfluous here, I do away with it.8 The results in this paper estab-
lish thus the existence of equilibria akin to sunspot equilibria but without the need
to make an explicit reference to sunspots —or, so to speak, to sunspot equilibria
without sunspots— which shows that the introduction of sunspot mechanisms is
not essential to account for pure expectations-driven fluctuations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the main ideas
by means of a leading example conveying what is driving the result: it produces
constructively rationally formed expectations equilibria exhibiting fluctuations dis-
tinct from those of any rational expectations equilibrium. Section 3 generalizes the
setup, provides a precise definition of a rationally formed expectations equilibrium
for a deterministic overlapping generations economy, and establishes the existence
of equilibria of this type exhibiting fluctuations that no rational expectations equi-
librium can generate. Incidentally, the constructive argument used to establish this
result reveals a high level of degrees of freedom to produce rationally formed expec-
tations equilibria. Therefore, I establish next the important fact that not anything
7In the sunspot equilibrium literature it is customary to claim that the prices turn out to be
perfectly correlated with the sunspot signal, and hence follow the same process, because the
decisions made by the agents according to their belief in such a perfect correlation causes the
contemporaneous prices to take the adequate values with the adequate probabilities for that perfect
correlation to actually take place. But how the agents’ decisions would achieve this is conspicuously
left unexplained.
8Note that if, on the contrary, the fundamentals do follow some stochastic process, the latter will
make its way through the equilibrium equations towards the equilibrium prices, in such a way
that one can safely speak in that case of a stochastic process driving prices. So, the caveat above
about assuming an objective price process is truly specific to the pure excess volatility case with
deterministic fundamentals that we are considering in this paper.
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can be a rationally formed expectations equilibrium. Section 4 embeds the notion
of rationally formed expectations equilibrium within an epistemic model specifying
an interactive system of beliefs and higher order beliefs in order to show that, very
much like common knowledge of rationality and market clearing does not neces-
sarily imply rational expectations in finite economies (see Ben-Porath and Heifetz
(2010)), common knowledge of rationality, market clearing, and of beliefs formation
rationality needs not lead to rational expectations equilibria either. Finally, Section
5 briefly discusses some related literature.
2. The leading example
2.1 What is a rationally formed expectations equilibrium?
Consider an overlapping generations economy with a 2-period lived representative
agent. An agent born in period t decides how much to save from real income y when
young (date t) in order to consume when old (date t+ 1). His decision will depend
on the purchasing power he expects his savings to have when old. In particular, if
the current price of consumption is pt and he expects it to be p
j
t+1 with probability
pij when old, for j = 1, . . . , k, then his savings mt would be the solution to
max
k∑
j=1
piju(ctt, c
tj
t+1)
ctt +m
t = y
ctjt+1 =
pt
pjt+1
mt
(1)
where ctt is his consumption when young and c
tj
t+1 is his consumption when old if
the level of prices then is pjt+1. Under standard assumptions guaranteeing differen-
tiability and the interiority of the solution, the necessary and sufficient first-order
condition characterizing the solution of the problem above is, along with its budget
constraints,
k∑
j=1
pij
[
− u1(y −mt, pt
pjt+1
mt) + u2(y −mt, pt
pjt+1
mt)
pt
pjt+1
]
= 0. (2)
At equilibrium every agent must choose his consumption rationally according to
his expectations about future prices, and individual consumption decisions must
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be compatible. Thus in an equilibrium of this economy in which the level of prices
takes, at any period, one of k possible values p1, . . . , pk, and the representative agent
believes that the probability piij of the price being pj when old depends only on the
price pi he faces when young, then the representative agent’s savings decision does
depend only on the level of prices pi he faces when young, so that it can be denoted
mi and be characterized as the solution to
k∑
j=1
piij
[
− u1(y −mi, p
i
pj
mi) + u2(y −mi, p
i
pj
mi)
pi
pj
]
= 0. (3)
Moreover, in such an equilibrium the contingent savings mi and prices pi, for all
i = 1, . . . , k, satisfy
mi =
pj
pi
mj (4)
for all i, j = 1, . . . , k, so that not only all the agents choose their savings rationally
according to their expectations, but markets clear as well (in effect, in any state i
the desired saving mi by the young agent equals then the desired consumption p
j
pim
j
by the contemporary old agent born in any state j). Conditions for the existence
of prices pi, savings mi, and probabilities piij , for i, j = 1, . . . , k, such that (3) and
(4) hold for all i, j = 1, . . . , k are well known,9 and such an equilibrium is known in
the literature as a k-state Markovian stationary sunspot equilibrium, or k-SSE.
Note however that, as soon as k ≥ 3 in equation (3), the same savings decision
mi can follow from different beliefs about the probabilities pii1, . . . , piik of transition
from a price pi to any other pj . In effect, at any such equilibrium each vector
(pii1, . . . , piik) of probabilities of transition from each state i = 1, . . . , k, must satisfy
the two linear equations consisting of (i) being in the unit simplex in Rk and (ii)
satisfying equation (3), so that there remains k− 2 degrees of freedom for each row
(pii1, . . . , piik) of the Markov matrix (piij)ki,j=1 of believed probabilities of transition
between prices, as illustrated in Figure 1 below for the case k = 3, where pii· ≡
(pii1, . . . , piik) and Aij ≡ −u1(y −mi, p
i
pjm
i) + u2(y −mi, p
i
pjm
i) p
i
pj .
9See the sunspot equilibrium literature, e.g. Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986),
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1988, 1989), Guesnerie (1986).
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Thus equations (3) and (4) may hold true —i.e., (i) everyone behaves rationally
given his beliefs and (ii) markets clear— even with different agents within and
across generations holding different beliefs about the probabilities of transition piij ,
if no further requirement is made on the agents’ beliefs. Of course, this possibility
is excluded if the agents are supposed to hold rational expectations, since in that
case all the agents must share the same ”true” piij ’s. Note however that no mention
has been made yet of a ”true” objective process from which this ”true” piij ’s would
stem, but rather of the agents’ expectations about future prices instead. That is
because in a k-state stationary sunspot equilibrium the probability piij with which
the agent expects the transition from a price pi to a price pj to happen is implic-
itly assumed to be the actual probability with which such transition does happen,
because of a never falsified belief in a perfect correlation between some sunspot sig-
nal and prices.10 Note that this amounts to assuming implicitly a price formation
mechanism that is extraneous to the equilibrium notion, very much like an ad hoc
choice of a particular equilibrium price out of a multiplicity of them in, for instance,
an Edgeworth box. More specifically, the rational expectations hypothesis imposes
the additional conditions that
(i) all agents’ expectations coincide, and
(ii) these common expectations correspond to those following from an objective
process driving prices.
10No explanation of how this correlation happens to come into existence is usually provided, except
for that of Woodford (1990), and in that case a small seed of uncertainty about the fundamentals
is needed for an accidental correlation to get reinforced and convergence to the ”sunspot theory”
to obtain.
8
Note that, in terms of the equilibrium equations (3) and (4), condition (ii) above has
no bite in the sunspot case, since it can just be dropped without any consequence
for the set of solutions to the equations. It is in this sense that the assumption
of an objective process driving prices is an implicitly ad hoc selection device in
the absence of shocks to the fundamentals. But condition (i) without (ii) becomes
arbitrary, and raises difficult questions regarding the spontaneous coordination of
every agent within and across the infinity of generations on a particular belief.
Accordingly, both conditions (i) and (ii) can arguably be dropped and the relevance
of the rational expectations hypothesis be questioned in the absence of shocks to
the fundamentals.
As a matter of fact, plenty of beliefs are compatible with the agents’ behavior, and
thus there is room for alternative consistency conditions at equilibrium (other than
the rational expectations hypothesis) to be imposed on the agents’ expectations.
The most natural is to assume the agents’ expectations should follow from the
information available to them at the time of making their decisions. Accordingly,
assuming that an agent’s decision follows from expectations derived from beliefs that
do not make the likelihood of the history of prices he observes as big as possible —
among all the expectations that would have led to the same decision— is equivalent
to assume that the agent formed his expectations using inefficiently the available
information. In Figure 2 below, for the case k = 3, the agent’s rationally formed
expectations about these probabilities of transition from a price pi (if he believes
the prices follow a Markov process) would be the point p¯ii·tδ (where t stands for
the date up to which the generation t can observe a history of prices δ) attaining
the highest likelihood level curve on the unit simplex among those consistent with
the first-order condition satisfied by the agent’s saving decision (represented by the
plane intersecting the unit simplex in Figure 2). Note that the empirical frequencies
of transitions starting from pi (the number of observed transitions from price pi to
each price pj over the number of times pi has realized, depicted as pii·tδ in Figure 2)
would be the beliefs that best explain the observed history if no consistency with
the agent’s choice is required, but such expectations need not be consistent with
the agent’s behavior, or will be so just by chance.
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Thus positive prices p¯i, savings m¯i, for all i = 1, . . . , k, and history-dependent
beliefs about a Markovian price process (p¯iijtδ)
k
i,j=1, for every history δ of prices and
up to every date t, such that
3∑
j=1
p¯iijtδ
[
− u1(y − m¯i, p¯
i
p¯j
m¯i) + u2(y − m¯i, p¯
i
p¯j
m¯i)
p¯i
p¯j
]
= 0 (5)
and
m¯j =
p¯i
p¯j
m¯i, ∀j = 1, . . . , k (6)
hold for all i = 1, . . . , k, and for every history δ up to every period t, constitute
a Markovian rationally formed expectations equilibrium if, and only if, any other
vector of probabilities pii· satisfying (5) implies a lower likelihood for the realization
of some history δ up to some period t than p¯ii·tδ does, for some i = 1, . . . , k.
Intuitively, as this example illustrates, at a rationally formed expectations equilib-
rium the expected probabilities p¯ii·tδ will typically be different for different genera-
tions, since they will have access to histories of different length or span, and hence
the observed empirical frequencies of transition pii·tδ will be different for different
t’s even for a given history δ. Also, within generations the need for each agent’s
expected probabilities to be consistent with their respective different choices leaves
room the agents’ beliefs to differ among them as well.
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2.2 Rationally formed expectations equilibria distinct
from rational expectations equilibria
From equations (5) and (6) —that differ from those of a sunspot equilibrium only in
that they make expectations history dependent— one could be tempted to suspect
that any rationally formed expectations equilibrium should converge to a sunspot
equilibrium, given that in the case in which an objective sunspot process is supposed
to drive prices the empirical frequencies of transition between prices would eventu-
ally converge to the actual probabilities of transition. As a consequence, there would
not be any allocational difference in the long run between the sunspot equilibrium
and the rationally formed expectations equilibrium in that case. Nevertheless, this
is not exactly so: there do exist rationally formed expectations equilibria whose
allocations are not rational expectations equilibrium allocations.
In order to show that rationally formed expectations equilibria do not replicate
rational expectations equilibria (in particular from the allocations viewpoint), I will
illustrate in this framework the existence of rationally formed expectations equilibria
fluctuating between a given set of states even when there is no stationary sunspot
equilibrium fluctuating between those states.
The argument is constructive, starting from a k-state Markovian stationary sunspot
equilibrium11 of an overlapping generations economy with a representative agent
with utility function u and endowments e = (e1, e2). That is to say, consider, for
all i = 1, . . . , k, a price pi, first and second period consumptions ci1 and c
i
2 and a
Markov matrix of probabilities of transition (piij)ki,j=1 such that, for all i = 1, . . . , k,
ci1 + c
i
2 = e1 + e2 (7)
and
(ci1, (c
j
2)
k
j=1) ∈ arg max
k∑
j=1
piiju(c˜i1, c˜
j
2)
pi(c˜i1−e1)+pj(c˜j2−e2)=0, ∀j
(8)
Then necessarily the contingent consumptions ci1, c
i
2 satisfy the equations, for all
i = 1, . . . , k
k∑
j=1
piijAij = 0 (9)
11See, for instance, Chappori and Guesnerie (1989).
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where Aij ≡ u1(ci1, cj2)(ci1− e1) +u2(ci1, cj2)(ci2− e2). Figure 1 above shows for k = 3
the linear constraint on the simplex that the equilibrium equations impose on the
probabilities of transition from any price pi.
Now imagine this was in fact an economy of two identical (types of) agents a and
b per generation, so that u and e are the utility and preferences uh and eh of both
agents h = a, b and, for all i, j = 1, . . . , k, ci1 and c
j
2 are the equilibrium contingent
consumptions chi1 and c
hj
2 of both h = a, b as well. Consider then a nearby economy
in which agent b has a different utility function ub close to u (while ua continues
to be u). Since ub is now different from, but close enough to u (in values and, at
least, first partial derivatives), then the linear constraints on each row of the Markov
matrix generated by the first order conditions of agent b still intersect the simplex
but differ from those of agents a. Actually, for some robust perturbations the new
linear constraints on the probabilities of transition have no intersection with the old
ones on the unit simplex, as illustrated in Figure 3 in the case k = 3.
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This implies that for the economies resulting from such perturbations there is no
Markov matrix that makes both agents a and b choose the contingent consumptions
ci1 and c
j
2 whenever facing the prices p
i, pj , for all i, j = 1, . . . , k. In effect, as long
as the perturbation makes the normal vector Ai·b to the second linear subspace in
(10) below —following from agent b’s first-order conditions— to be distinct from
the corresponding vector Ai·a normal to a’s linear subspace in (10) while in the span
of Ai·a and the normal vector to the unit simplex (1, . . . , 1), then the system in
12
pii1, . . . , piik
k∑
j=1
piijAija = 0
k∑
j=1
piijAijb = 0
(10)
has no solution within the unit simplex.12 Note that there is a (k− 2)-dimensional
manifold (after normalization) of possible vectors Ai·b satisfying this condition. Of
course, any other small enough perturbation of any vector on this manifold would
still be such that no k-state Markovian stationary sunspot equilibrium exists with
this support for the corresponding 2-agent overlapping generations economy, so that
the property is robust.
Notwithstanding, there do exist rationally formed expectations equilibria over the
given support for any of the 2-agent economies resulting from such robust per-
turbations. In effect, for small enough perturbations the unit simplex still has a
nonempty intersection with the linear subspaces following from the agents’ first-
order conditions and hence, for all h, δ, and t, there exist probabilities (pihijtδ )
k
i,j=1,
that maximize the likelihood
∏k
i,j=1(pi
ij)
Pt
τ=1 δ
i
τ−1δ
j
τ of observing the history δ up
to period t, among the probabilities of transition in the unit simplex that are con-
sistent with the agents’ first-order conditions (the existence, illustrated in Figure 4
below for k = 3, is guaranteed by the continuity of the likelihood function and the
compactness of the constrained domain).
Figure 4
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12Indeed, if Ai·b = αA
i·
a + β1 with β 6= 0, then (10) above would imply
P
j pi
ij = 0!!
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Thus the allocations, prices, and agent-specific, history-contingent beliefs deter-
mined by the perturbed conditions constitute a rationally formed expectations equi-
librium whose allocation cannot be that of a rational expectations equilibrium. The
next section shows this leading example to be general
3. Rationally formed expectations equilibria
of overlapping generations economies
Consider a deterministic stationary overlapping generations 1-good exchange econ-
omy with a representative generation consisting of a number H of 2-period lived
agents with utility function uh and endowments eh = (eh1 , e
h
2 ) of the good, for all
h = 1, . . . ,H. Agents have access to historical records of length m (maybe infinity),
so that they know the price of the good in the last m periods. I will assume more-
over, without loss of generality, that the agents believe that prices follow a k-state
Markov chain over k prices.13
In what follows, histories of prices {pt}t∈T (where T can be either the set of positive
integers N or the set of all integers Z)14 taking at any period any of a finite number15
k of possible values p1, . . . , pk, are denoted by means of a function δit indicating
whether the price pi has been realized at period t or not. Thus δit = 1 whenever
pt = pi, and equals 0 otherwise. Since only one price can prevail at any period t,
it must hold that
∑k
i=1 δ
i
t = 1 for all t ∈ T . Therefore, a history of realizations
is a sequence δ = {δt}t∈T of k-tuples of k − 1 zeros and one 1 at the position of
the realized price at that period, that is to say, for all t ∈ T , δt ∈ {0, 1}k and∑k
i=1 δ
i
t = 1. Let ∆ denote the set of such sequences.
A specific instance16 of a rationally formed expectations equilibrium is defined next.
Definition. A rationally formed expectations equilibrium of the deterministic sta-
13I will argue below that this assumption is not restrictive except for the counterfactual case in
which memory m is infinite and T = Z.
14In the case T = N, a special first generation of agents born old is assumed as usual.
15Prices can be thought of as being expressed in multiples of euro cents, and to be believed by the
agents to be below some sufficiently high value with probability 0, so that prices can take indeed
only a finite number (although maybe very big) of values, for all practical purposes.
16In particular, with Markovian beliefs over a finite number of prices.
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tionary overlapping generations exchange economy with representative generation
(uh, eh)Hh=1 with memory m consists of
(i) a finite number of positive prices for consumption pi > 0, i = 1, . . . , k,
(ii) nonnegative first-period consumptions and contingent plans of second-period
consumptions (chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1) for each agent h = 1, . . . ,H at each possible
price when young, i.e. i = 1, . . . , k
(iii) beliefs about the probabilities of transition between prices, i.e. a Markov
matrix (pihijtδ )
k
i,j=1, for each agent h = 1, . . . ,H and any history of prices
δ ∈ ∆ up to his date of birth t ∈ T ,17
such that
(c.1) the allocation is feasible, i.e. for all i = 1, . . . , k
H∑
h=1
(chi1 + c
hi
2 ) =
H∑
h=1
(eh1 + e
h
2 ) (11)
(c.2) for any history δ ∈ ∆ and every agent h = 1, . . . ,H born at any date
t ∈ T , his first-period consumption and contingent plan of second-period
consumptions (chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1) are optimal, given his beliefs, whenever at t
the price is pi, for all i = 1, . . . , k, so that it solves
max
k∑
j=1
pihijtδ u
h(ci1, c
j
2)
s.t. pi(ci1 − eh1 ) + pj(cj2 − eh2 ) = 0, ∀j
(12)
(c.3) for any history δ ∈ ∆ and every agent h = 1, . . . ,H born at any date t ∈ T ,
no other beliefs for which (chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1) is optimal when at t the price is
pi, for all i = 1, . . . , k, provide a higher likelihood to the history of prices he
remembers, i.e. if pii· ∈ Sk−1 is such that (chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1) solves
max
k∑
j=1
piijuh(ci1, c
j
2)
s.t. pi(ci1 − eh1 ) + pj(cj2 − eh2 ) = 0, ∀j
(13)
17Note that although with this notation every agent is supposed to hold beliefs about the prob-
abilities of transition after every history (i.e. even those beyond his life-span), only the histories
up to the date of his decision are relevant. If memory is finite, the number of histories relevant
for the agent’s decision is finite, so that he is required to hold only finitely many beliefs. In the
infinite memory case this is still the case if there is a first period, but not if there is not one: in
that case the number of beliefs would be countable.
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then
k∏
j=1
(piij)
Pt
τ=t′ δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1 ≤
k∏
j=1
(pihijtδ )
Pt
τ=t′ δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1 (14)
where t′ = t−m if T = Z and t′ = max{1, t−m} if T = N, and
(c.4) when T = Z and m =∞, for any history δ ∈ ∆ and every agent h = 1, . . . ,H
born at any t ∈ T , his beliefs are not falsified by the information available
then, i.e. for all i, j = 1, . . . , k,
pihijδt = limt′→−∞
∑t−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τ
(15)
whenever the limit exists.
Some remarks on the definition above are in order. Note first that if the beliefs are
constrained to be history and agent independent (so that pihijδt becomes pi
ij) and the
last conditions (c.3) and (c.4) are dropped, then the definition above becomes that of
a stationary rational expectations (sunspot) equilibrium following a k-state Markov
chain, or k-SSE.18 Note that condition (c.4) is trivially satisfied by such a k-SSE
but, crucially, (c.3) is not. As a consequence, in a rational expectations equilibrium
there exist typically, for every agent, beliefs about the probabilities of transition that
are consistent with his consumption choice but that make the history he observes
likelier than the equilibrium beliefs do. Of course the discrepancy between the
agents’ beliefs and those maximizing the likelihood of history while rationalizing
the choices vanishes in the limit if, as in the sunspot equilibrium interpretation, the
prices are supposed to actually follow a given Markov chain. But the determination
of prices by a specific stochastic process is difficult to justify in the absence of shocks
to the fundamentals.
Secondly, condition (c.3) is not superfluous. If instead of condition (c.3) only the
existence of subjective beliefs rationalizing the agents’ choices was required (re-
gardless of history), that would imply a set of equilibrium allocations and prices
that is a strict superset of the set of rationally-formed expectations equilibria. In
effect, while any rationally-formed expectations equilibrium clearly satisfies the ex-
istence of subjective beliefs rationalizing the agents’ choices, there are consumption
18See, for instance, Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), Chiappori and Guesnerie
(1988, 1989), Guesnerie (1986). On the notion of sunspot equilibrium see Cass and Shell (1983).
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plans, prices and arbitrary, history-independent subjective beliefs rationalizing the
agents’ choices that are not rationally-formed expectations equilibria, since history-
independent beliefs cannot solve the problem (23) below —equivalent to condition
(c.3)— for all realizations of history.
Finally, note also that, as previously claimed, the restriction to beliefs in Markovian
prices is not constraining for finite memory or T = N. In effect, such an assumption
cannot be refuted by the agents unless the data available to them is able to falsify
it, but for that to be the case it must at least allow to establish that the empirical
frequencies are not Cauchy.19 That is to say, it must allow to conclude that the
distance between any two empirical frequencies at dates t < t′ from any pi to pj
does not become arbitrarily small, for t, t′ sufficiently far away down the sequence.
In other words, for the agents to be able to discard the assumption of Markovian
prices they would need to have infinite histories and memories, so that no data can
falsify that assumption if T = N or m is finite.20
As a matter of fact, for any two consecutive terms21 the distance between the
empirical frequencies of transitions converges to zero along the sequence, since∣∣∣∣∣
∑t+1
τ=1 δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t+1
τ=1 δ
i
τ
−
∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τ
∣∣∣∣∣ = δit+1∑t+1
τ=1 δ
i
τ
·
∣∣∣∣∣δjt+2 −
∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τ
∣∣∣∣∣ (16)
and
(1) either pi is visited finitely many times and then for some t onwards δit = 0,
so that the distance between the empirical frequencies of transition becomes
0 from that term on, and the empirical frequency of transition from pi to pj
becomes constant and therefore convergent,
(2) or pi is visited countably many times and then the first factor in the right-
hand side converges to zero,22 while the second factor between brackets is
19If the sequence of empirical frequencies of transitions from any pi to pj was Cauchy, then
completeness would imply its convergence, which would support the Markovian assumption.
20On the contrary, when T = Z and m is infinite, the agents can compute the empirical frequency
at any given date t of the transitions from any price pi to pj as the limit
lim
t′→−∞
Pt−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τ δ
j
τ+1Pt−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τ
.
Should this limit not exist, the Markovian assumption would then be falsified by the data in this
case.
21Actually, for any two terms a fixed number of periods apart.
22The numerator is bounded and the denominator is both non-decreasing and not non-increasing.
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bounded in [0, 1],23 so that the distance between empirical frequencies of
transition from pi to pj converges to zero.
Thus, when T = N and agents have unrestricted memory, not only the agents do
not have enough information to falsify the Markovian prices assumption, but also
they will see vanish progressively any dependence of the probabilities of transition
on earlier prices (as differences between subsequent empirical frequencies converge
to zero), i.e. Markovian prices tend to be confirmed (although not proved), rather
than falsified.
Of course, agents can all believe in Markovian prices while not necessarily agreeing
on the specific probabilities of transition governing that process, since they have
access to different bits of history when T = N or memory is finite. On the contrary,
if memory is infinite and T = Z, they all have to agree on the probabilities of
transitions as well if the limit in (15) above exists for every t; while, if memory
is infinite and T = N, they all ”eventually agree”, meaning that discrepancies of
subsequent generations tend to vanish. In the last two cases, in which agents agree
(maybe asymptotically) on the probabilities of transition, the limit of the empirical
frequencies would necessarily have to be in the intersection on the unit simplex of
the linear subspaces determined by the agents’ first-order conditions, as proclaimed
in Proposition 1 below (the proof is straightforward). In other words, if memory
is infinite, the only rationally formed expectations equilibria are those for which
such an intersection exists, but these equilibria are allocationally equivalent to the
rational expectations (sunspot) equilibrium associated with such an intersection.
Proposition 1. If the agents’ memory m is infinite, any rationally formed expecta-
tions equilibrium of the stationary deterministic overlapping generations exchange
economy (uh, eh)Hh=1 is allocationally equivalent
24 to a k-state sunspot equilibrium.
Rationally formed expectations equilibria distinct from a rational expectations equi-
librium exist in this setup, therefore, only if memory is finite. There can be many
reasons why m finite is the relevant case. People tend to make forecasts based on
their recent experiences, with memories of variable lengths, but certainly of finite
length if only because of their actual limited recording and computing abilities. Thus
the limited memory case seems to be the relevant one, while the equivalence of ra-
tionally formed expectations equilibria and rational expectations sunspot equilibria
23The first term is in {0, 1} and the second is in [0, 1].
24In the sense of sharing the same allocation as support.
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in the infinite memory case rather highlights the role played by limited knowledge
in making possible rationally formed expectations equilibria distinct from rational
expectations equilibria.
The next proposition establishes the main result of the paper, namely that any de-
terministic stationary overlapping generations economy with sunspot equilibria can
be perturbed robustly in order to produce rationally formed expectations equilibria
that no sunspot equilibrium can match.
Proposition 2. Arbitrarily close25 to every deterministic stationary overlapping
generations economy with a k-state stationary sunspot equilibrium there exists an
economy with finite-memory rationally formed expectations equilibria distinct from
any rational expectations equilibrium.
Proof. Let (uh, eh)h∈H be the utility and endowments of the members of the rep-
resentative generation of a stationary overlapping generations economy, and let{
pi, (c¯hi1 , c¯
hi
2 )h∈H
}k
i=1
be the contingent prices and consumptions of a k-state sta-
tionary sunspot equilibrium of the economy driven by a Markov chain with proba-
bilities of transition (piij)ki,j=1.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the allocation in this equilibrium to the
agents of type h0 ∈ H is feasible with their only resources, i.e.26
c¯h0i1 + c¯
h0i
2 = e
h0
1 + e
h0
2 . (17)
Consider a new economy with a representative generation (uh, eh)h∈H∪{h1} consist-
ing of adding to H an agent h1 with the same endowments and consumptions as
agent h0,27 and a utility function uh1 with gradients at the consumption bundles
(c¯h1i1 , c¯
h1j
2 )
k
i,j=1 such that, for some i = 1, . . . , k, the vectors
28
Aiuh0 = (A
i1
uh0 , . . . , A
ik
uh0 )
Aiuh1 = (A
i1
uh1 , . . . , A
ik
uh1 )
(18)
25In the topology of C1-convergence over compacta in the space of utility functions.
26There is always a subset of types of agents for which this is true (note that this subset needs not
be proper). In general, the replication and perturbation argument to be done next would then be
done on all the types of agents in the subset.
27The new allocation of the new economy is feasible because of the assumption in (17).
28Where
Aij
uh
≡ D1uh(c¯hi1 , c¯hj2 )(c¯hi1 − eh1 ) +D2uh(c¯hi1 , c¯hj2 )(c¯hj2 − eh2 )
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are linearly independent, while adding 1 = (1, . . . , 1) makes them linearly depen-
dent, i.e.
Aiuh1 = αA
i
uh0 + β1 (19)
for some α and some β 6= 0.29 Then the system
pii1Ai1uh0 + · · ·+ piikAikuh0 = 0
pii1Ai1uh1 + · · ·+ piikAikuh1 = 0
(20)
has no solution in the probabilities pii1, . . . , piik. In effect, should there be one, using
equation (19) above, the second equation can be written equivalently as
α
(
pii1Ai1uh0 + · · ·+ piikAikuh0
)
+ β(pii1 + · · ·+ piik) = 0 (21)
but from the first equation in (20) and β 6= 0, then one would have to have that
pii1 + · · ·+ piik = 0 !! (22)
This establishes that the prices and consumptions
{
pi, (c¯hi1 , c¯
hi
2 )h∈H∪{h1}
}k
i=1
, with
(c¯h1i1 , c¯
h1j
2 )
k
i,j=1 = (c¯
h0i
1 , c¯
h0j
2 )
k
i,j=1, are not those of a sunspot equilibrium of the
economy with representative generation (uh, eh)h∈H∪{h1}.
30
They are, nevertheless, the allocation and prices of a rationally formed expectations
equilibrium of an arbitrarily close economy. In effect, if uh1 is close enough to uh0
in the topology of C1-convergence over compacta, then for all h ∈ H ∪ {h1}, all
t ∈ T , and all δ ∈ ∆, there exists (pihijtδ )ki,j=1 solution to
max
piij
k∏
i,j=1
(piij)
Pt
τ=t′ δ
i
τ−1δ
j
τ
s.t. ∀i, pii·∈Sk−1
∀i, (c¯hi1 ,{c¯hj2 }j)=arg max
P
j pi
ijuh(ci1,c
j
2)
s.t. pi(ci1−eh1 )+pj(cj2−eh2 )=0, ∀j
(23)
for any h. Note that the equilibrium conditions for a k-SSE type of sunspot equilibrium are
kX
j=1
piijAij
uh
= 0
for all i = 1, . . . , k.
29Note that since
Pk
j=1 pi
ijAij
uh0
= 0, the vector Ai
uh0
cannot be collinear to 1. Moreover there
is a 1-dimensional manifold of directions that the vector Ai
uh1
can take while satisfying these
conditions.
30Otherwise, system (20) would have a solution in pii1, . . . , piik, for all i.
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—where t′ = t−m if T = Z, and t′ = max{1, t−m} if T = N— since the objective
function is continuous, and the constrained set is non-empty and compact. The
same is true for any robust and small enough perturbation u˜h1 of uh1 , therefore not
necessarily for Ai
u˜h1
in the span of Ai
u˜h0
and 1.
Finally, since m is finite, the remembered empirical frequencies of the transitions
do not falsify the agents’ beliefs.
Q.E.D.
4. Epistemic status of rationally formed expectations equilibria
In order to compare the epistemic requirements of a rationally formed expectations
equilibrium with those of rational expectations equilibria, I will discuss it here within
a model specifying an interactive system of beliefs and higher order beliefs in order
to compare it from an epistemic viewpoint with rational expectations equilibria.
For the sake of clarity, this will be done without specifying the cardinality of agents
and goods, as well as the demographics of the economy.31 As it will be seen below,
the equilibrium notions do not depend conceptually on these details, while there is
a clear notational advantage in overlooking them at this stage.
A definition of a rational expectations equilibrium corresponding to Radner (1979)
is next first, followed by a discussion of its epistemic implicit assumptions.
Definition 1. Given a probability distribution pi over a set of states of nature S
and an economy {(uhs , ehs )s∈S , Ih}h∈H (where, for all h ∈ H, Ih is a partition of
S)32 a rational expectations equilibrium is a set of contingent consumptions
31Thus the case where the number of states, goods and agents is not finite, and agents may be
endowed with, and have preferences on, only a few goods (of which the overlapping generations
setup is an instance) is therefore comprised in the following discussion. Obviously, sums stand for
the adequate aggregations and measures when infinities are involved.
32The endowments ehs are measurable with respect to I
h, so that agents know their endowments.
In what follows Ihs denotes the element of the partition I
h containing (state) s. Also, for all s and
all h, uhs ∈ RR
l
+ has the usual properties and ehs ∈ Rl+.
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and prices {(chs )h∈H , ps}s∈S such that
(a.1) for all s ∈ S ∑
h∈H
(chs − ehs ) ≤ 0 (24)
(a.2) for all h ∈ H
(chs )s∈S ∈ arg max
(cs)s∈S
∑
s∈S
pisu
h
s (cs)
ps(cs − ehs ) ≤ 0,∀s ∈ S
cs = cs′ ,∀s ∈ S, ∀s′ ∈ Ihs such that ps = ps′
(25)
The last constraint of the optimization problem in condition (a.2) in Definition
1 prevents agents that are (possibly asymmetrically) uncertain about the state of
nature s from conditioning on things they cannot see, either directly through their
information partition Ih or by being revealed by prices.
Implicitly in the previous definition each agent h is obviously knows at least {pis, uhs ,
ehs , ps}s∈S and Ih —otherwise his choice could not be modeled as in (a.2) above—
other than this, the agents do not need to have any further knowledge at a rational
expectations equilibrium as defined above. In particular, no common knowledge of
anything is needed to sustain a rational expectations equilibrium (some common
knowledge has nonetheless been required to address some strong features of the
definition above, like the need of agents to know the entire price function (ps)s∈S
and the generic full revelation of prices —see McAllister (1990)— but as far as the
epistemic requirements of rational expectations equilibria as defined above is con-
cerned, nothing more than {pis, uhs , ehs , ps}s∈S and Ih for each agent h is required).33
33This has a parallel in the epistemic conditions for a Nash equilibrium characterized in Aumann
and Brandemburger (1995). In effect, as the authors point out there, Nash equilibria —understood,
as usual, as profiles of randomizations over pure strategies— require (besides the agents’ ratio-
nality) only the knowledge by the agents of their own payoffs and their mutual knowledge of
each other’s strategies. Interestingly enough, again no common knowledge of anything is actu-
ally required (common knowledge is only required to make sense of the interpretation of Nash
equilibria as profiles of commonly held conjectures about each player’s action, and this only when
there are at least three players). In the current context, this amounts to the agents knowledge of
the elements determining (and constraining) their payoffs, i.e. {pis, uhs , ehs , ps}s∈S (the assumed
price-taking behavior voiding of content in this case the requirement of mutual knowledge of each
others’ decisions).
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Notwithstanding, at a rational expectations equilibrium each agent h knows implic-
itly more than just {pis, uhs , ehs , ps}s∈S and Ih. In effect, he actually knows that, and
what he can deduce from that. In effect, firstly an agent h is able to tell, at any
given state s, whether an event E ⊂ S has happened or not, based on Ih, if, and
only if, he assigns a probability to E conditional to Ihs of either 1 or 0 respectively,
i.e. if, and only if, Ihs ⊂ E or Ihs ⊂ EC respectively, where EC = S \ E (more
generally, he attaches at IHs a probability P (E | Ihs ) to any event E). Nevertheless,
the knowledge of the equilibrium prices (ps)s∈S allows him to tell as well whether
an event has happened or not based also on the partition {p−1(ps)}s∈S induced by
prices.34 Of course this means that at a rational expectations equilibrium h is able
to tell whether E has happened or not at state s if, and only if, Ihs ∩ p−1(ps) ⊂ E
or Ihs ∩ p−1(ps) ⊂ EC respectively (more generally, he attaches at Ihs and ps a
probability P (E | Ihs ∩ p−1(ps)) to event E), which allows him to notice (and hence
condition on) a bigger set of events than with Ih alone.
As the definition above makes clear, a defining feature of a rational expectations
equilibrium is that agents are supposed to share the same prior pi over the states of
nature. At a rationally formed expectations equilibrium this requirement is dropped
instead, and just a rational use of the available information (Ih and p for each agent
h) is required.35 A formal definition on a rationally formed expectations equilibrium
is next, after which we discuss how its implicit epistemic assumptions compare to
those of the rational expectations equilibria.
Definition 2. Given a set of states of nature S and an economy {(uhs , ehs )s∈S , Ih}h∈H
(where, for all h ∈ H, Ih is a partition of S)36 a rationally formed expectations
equilibrium is a set of contingent consumptions, beliefs and prices {(chs , pihs )h∈H ,
ps}s∈S such that
(a.1) for all s ∈ S ∑
h∈H
(chs − ehs ) ≤ 0 (26)
34Where p ∈ (RL++)S stands for the function assigning ps to s.
35There is thus room for different agents to hold different expectations at a rationally formed
expectations equilibrium.
36The endowments ehs are measurable with respect to I
h, so that agents know their endowments.
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(a’.2) for all h ∈ H,37
(chs )s∈S ∈ arg max
∑
s∈S
pihs u
h
s (cs)
ps(cs − ehs ) ≤ 0,∀s ∈ S
cs = cs′ ,∀s ∈ S, ∀s′ ∈ Ihs such that ps = ps′
(27)
(a.3) for all h ∈ H, and all (pis)s∈S such that
(chs )s∈S ∈ arg max
∑
s∈S
pisu
h
s (cs)
ps(cs − ehs ) ≤ 0,∀s ∈ S
cs = cs′ ,∀s ∈ S, ∀s′ ∈ Ihs such that ps = ps′
(28)
it holds that, for all s ∈ S,∑
s′∈Ihs ∩p−1(ps)
pis′ ≤
∑
s′∈Ihs ∩p−1(ps)
pihs′
As opposed to the previous definition of a rational expectations equilibrium, the
agents are not required to hold the same prior anymore, but a new condition (a.3)
still imposes a consistency condition that prevents agents to hold arbitrary priors:
their priors (pihs )s∈S must satisfy that no other beliefs (pis)s∈S rationalizing their
choices attach a higher likelihood to whatever event Ihs ∩p−1(ps) they observe (either
directly or through prices).
Note that from the definitions neither rational expectations implies rationally formed
expectations, nor conversely. In effect, for a rationally formed expectations equilib-
rium to be a rational expectations equilibrium all the agents would have to hold a
common prior on the state of the world, which need not be the case. Also for a ra-
tional expectations equilibrium to be a rationally formed expectations equilibrium
the additional non-trivial condition (a.3) above needs to be satisfied, which again
needs not be the case for any given rational expectations equilibrium.
37Note that this is not the same as (a.2) since beliefs can differ across agents here.
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As a matter of fact, none of the two equilibrium notions is a particular case of the
other but, according to the definitions above, the two share the same epistemic
requirements nonetheless, since what is implied about the agents’ knowledge by the
definition of a rationally formed expectations equilibrium is the same as in a rational
expectations equilibrium. In effect, what the agents are supposed to know at a ra-
tionally formed expectations equilibrium, as well as what they can deduce from that
knowledge, is —as in the case of a rational expectations equilibrium— determined
only by their information partitions Ih, for each h, and the partition {p−1(ps)}s∈S
induced by prices, which is the information about the state of nature conveyed by
prices. Neither the fact that in a rationally formed expectations equilibrium the
agents may hold different priors about the state of nature, nor its additional condi-
tion (a.3) adds anything that is not already implicit in the knowledge by each agent
h of {pihs , uhs , ehs , ps}s∈S and Ih and what is implied by this.
In order to see that, on top of no common knowledge assumption being necessary
to sustain neither a rational expectations equilibrium nor a rationally formed ex-
pectations equilibrium, the two concepts are actually more stringent than common
knowledge of rationality and market clearing,38 let us consider first the following
extension of the Definition 1 above of a rational expectations equilibrium. Specifi-
cally, let us allow for each agent h to be of different types th ∈ Th that, while having
no impact on the fundamentals, can nonetheless be relevant for the equilibrium, if
only because the agents may believe that opponents of different types may behave
differently. Making this possibility explicit calls for specifying an interactive system
of beliefs and high order beliefs about the other agents beliefs. This, of course,
leaves room for the agents to hold different beliefs about prices in different states of
the world (which now include the profile of agents’ types (th)h∈H alongside the state
of nature s) thus necessarily departing from the rational expectations equilibrium
notion.
Definition 3. Given a probability distribution pi over a set of states of nature S and
an economy {(uhs , ehs )s∈S , Ih}h∈H (where, for all h ∈ H, Ih is a partition of the set
S)39 a set of contingent consumptions and prices {(chst)h∈H , pst}s∈S,t∈×hTh (where
th stands for a type for each agent h) is consistent with common knowledge
38For rational expectations equilibria this has been established in Ben-Porath and Heifetz (2010)
for finite exchange economies with asymmetric information.
39The endowments ehs are measurable with respect to I
h, so that agents know their endowments.
Here also Ihs denotes the element of the partition I
h containing (state) s. Also, for all s and all h,
uhs ∈ RR
l
+ has the usual properties and ehs ∈ Rl+.
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of rationality and market clearing if, and only if,
(b.1) for all s ∈ S and all t ∈ ×hTh∑
h
(chst − ehs ) ≤ 0 (29)
(b.2) for all h ∈ H and all th ∈ Th
(chst)s,t−h ∈ arg max
∑
s,t−h
pihstu
h
s (cst)
pst(cst − ehs ) ≤ 0,∀s,∀t−h
cst = cs′t′ ,∀s,∀s′ ∈ Ihs ,∀t, t′ such that
th = t′h and pst = ps′t′
(30)
for some belief pihst ∈ ∆(S × (×hTh)) over states of the world such that, for
all h ∈ H and all th ∈ Th, ∑
t−h
pihst = pis (31)
Condition (b.1) requires the allocation to clear markets in every state of the world,
guaranteeing thus common knowledge of market clearing. Condition (b.2), given
the measurability constraint, clearly implies that, for every agent h ∈ H and state
of the world (s, t) ∈ S × (×hTh),
chst ∈ arg max uhs (cst)
pst(cst − ehs ) ≤ 0
(32)
which guarantees common knowledge of rationality. Condition (b.2), finally, re-
quires too the agents to hold beliefs that, while not necessarily in accordance with
those of other agents when it comes to beliefs about the state of the world, they
agree nonetheless of the objective probabilities about the state of nature.40
40Note that condition (b.2) implies also that, for all h ∈ H and all th ∈ Th, clearlyX
s,t−h
pihst = 1
so that each agent h of each type th knows his own type.
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It is straightforward to see that any rational expectations equilibrium ((chs )h, ps)s is
consistent with (although does not require) common knowledge of rationality and
market clearing (letting all chst and pst be trivially c
h
s and ps respectively, and pi
h
st
be any such that the last condition in (b.2) holds). The fact that the converse is
not true is precisely what has been established for finite exchange economies with
asymmetric information in Ben-Porath and Heifetz (2010).
Similarly, the Definition 2 of a rationally formed expectations equilibrium can be
extended as follows to include a system of interactive beliefs guaranteeing common
knowledge of rationality, market clearing, and belief formation rationality.
Definition 4. Given an economy {(uhs , ehs )s∈S , Ih}h∈H (where, for all h ∈ H, Ih is
a partition of a set S of states of nature)41 a set of contingent consumptions, beliefs,
and prices {(chst, pihst)h∈H , pst}s∈S,t∈×hTh (where th stands for a type for each agent
h) is consistent with common knowledge of rationality, market clearing,
and belief formation rationality if, and only if,
(b.1) for all s ∈ S and all t ∈ ×hTh∑
h
(chst − ehs ) ≤ 0 (33)
(b’.2) for all h ∈ H and all th ∈ Th,
(chst)s,t−h ∈ arg max
(cst)s,t−h
∑
s,t−h
pihstu
h
s (cst)
pst(cst − ehs ) ≤ 0,∀s,∀t−h
cst = cs′t′ ,∀s,∀s′ ∈ Ihs ,∀t, t′ such that
th = t′h and pst = ps′t′
(34)
(b.3) for all h ∈ H, all th ∈ Th, and all (pist)s∈S,t∈×hTh such that
(chst)s,t−h ∈ arg max
(cst)s,t−h
∑
s,t−h
pistu
h
s (cst)
pst(cst − ehs ) ≤ 0,∀s,∀t−h
cst = cs′t′ ,∀s,∀s′ ∈ Ihs ,∀t, t′ such that
th = t′h and pst = ps′t′
(35)
41The endowments ehs are measurable with respect to I
h, so that agents know their endowments.
Here also Ihs denotes the element of the partition I
h containing (state) s. Also, for all s and all h,
uhs ∈ RR
l
+ has the usual properties and ehs ∈ Rl+.
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it holds that, for all s ∈ S and all th ∈ Th∑
t′∈×hTh|t′h=th
s′∈Ihs ∩p−1(pst′ )
pis′t′ ≤
∑
t′∈×hTh|t′h=th
s′∈Ihs ∩p−1(pst′ )
pihs′t′ (36)
Conditions (b.1) and (b’.2) guarantee, as before, common knowledge of market
clearing and rationality respectively. Condition (b.3), in its turn, guarantees to be
common knowledge that no one could hold other beliefs rationalizing his choice that
attach a higher likelihood to the event he observes, i.e. that the beliefs held are
rationally formed.
Since any rationally formed expectations equilibrium ((chs , pi
h
s )h, ps)s is clearly con-
sistent with (although do not require) the conditions in Definition 4 for common
knowledge of rationality, market clearing, and belief formation rationality (letting
all chst, pst and pi
h
st be trivially c
h
s , ps, and pi
h
s respectively) and, according to Proposi-
tion 2, there are rationally formed expectations equilibria distinct from any rational
expectations equilibrium, adding common knowledge of belief formation rationality
to that of rationality and market clearing is still not enough to guarantee rational
expectations equilibrium outcomes.42
Finally, it is important to realize also that, according to the two definitions above,
deterministic environments do not necessarily imply deterministic equilibrium allo-
cations and prices. In effect, in the definition of a rational expectations equilibrium
provided above, the fundamentals uhs and e
h
s might actually not depend on the
state of the world s and the economy might still have non-deterministic rational
expectations equilbria, i.e. sunspot equilibria. This is a well-known fact that fol-
lows from the sufficient characterization by Cass and Shell (1983) of the conditions
under which sunspots do not matter (basically those of a finite, convex, complete
markets Arrow-Debreu economy), which essentially opened the path towards estab-
lishing subsequently that sunspots do matter in almost any other setup.43 That the
same can be said about rationally formed expectations equilibria is what this paper
42Ben-Porath and Heifetz (2010) had already established that common knowledge of rationality
and market clearing alone is not able to guarantee a rational expectations equilibrium outcome.
43That is to say, with infinitely many agents or goods, or with incomplete markets, or with non
convex preferences or productions sets.
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establishes. Note once more that the epistemic status of both rational expectations
and rationally formed expectations equilibria, being the same, has no import on
this fact.
5. Discussion
Firstly, given that Proposition 2 establishes that rationally formed expectations
equilibria can account for more fluctuations than rational expectations equilibria,
one would like to have an idea of where do the limits of this expansion lay or, at
least, whether the proposed equilibrium notion does not go too far as to be able to
rationalize any fluctuations as an equilibrium phenomenon. In order to see that not
anything can be made into a rationally formed expectations equilibrium, consider
a feasible allocation of consumptions ci1, c
i
2, for all i = 1, . . . , k, such that for some
agent and some price pi, it holds that all his trades contingent to any price pj he
may face in his second period of life imply a higher marginal rate of substitution of
future for present consumption than the corresponding implicit relative price, i.e.
Aij ≡ D1u(ci1, cj2)(ci1 − e1) +D2u(ci1, cj2)(ci2 − e2) < 0 (37)
for all j = 1, . . . , k. For this to happen, it suffices —in the case the marginal
rate of substitution is smaller than 1 at the endowments point— that ci1 is small
enough whenever the solutions are guaranteed to be always interior. Then the set
of expectations consistent with the agent’s choice of ci1 when facing p
i in his first
period of life is empty (the fist-order conditions of (12) in the definition cannot
be satisfied, since the associated hyperplane does not intersect the unit simplex,
its normal direction being in the strictly positive orthant). As a consequence, no
fluctuations between the feasible allocation of such consumption levels ci1, c
i
2, for all
i = 1, . . . , k, can result from a rationally formed expectations equilibrium.
Finally, the rationality condition considered here on the formation of expectations
seems reminiscent of the one underlying the rational beliefs equilibrium concept of
Kurz (1994a,b). Nonetheless, rationally formed expectations differ essentially from
Kurz’s rational beliefs. The two concepts only share the idea that the rationality
of expectations or ”beliefs should be defined relative to what is learnable from the
data” (Kurz (1994b), p.879). Otherwise, Kurz (1994b) requires the agents to believe
that prices are driven by a process whose long term behavior coincides with that
of the true process. Leaving aside the problem posed by the ad hoc character of
such a true process in the pure extrinsic uncertainty case, in order to infer such long
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term behavior Kurz (1994b) assumes that the agents have access to infinitely long
histories of past prices, a formidable feat that the rationally formed expectations
equilibrium deliberately avoids to assume.
Also Hommes (1998) and Hommes and Sorger (1998) introduce in a different setup
an equilibrium notion, the consistent expectations equilibrium, which imposes as
well a condition of consistency with available data, namely the zero (limit of) auto-
correlations of errors made in past forecasts based on history, so that they cannot
be distinguished from white noise. Note however that in a consistent expecta-
tions equilibrium agents try to forecast a relevant variable, say a price, while in
the setup considered here they try to forecast the probability distribution of that
variable. Also the consistent expectations equilibrium notion makes implicitly the
counterfactual assumption, as in Kurz (1994a,b), that infinitely many records of
past realizations of this variable are always available and agents have an infinite
memory and computation ability allowing to process them, otherwise finite sample
autocorrelations of a given number of lags will always be typically nonzero.
References
Aumann, R. and A. Brandenburger (1995): ”Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equi-
librium”, Econometrica, 63, 1161–1180
Azariadis, C. (1981): ”Self-fulfilling prophecies”, Journal of Economic Theory, 25,
380–396
Azariadis, C. and R. Guesnerie (1986): ”Sunspots and Cycles”, Review of Economic
Studies, 53, 725–736
Ben-Porath, E. and A. Heifetz (2010): ”Common Kowledge of Rationality and Mar-
ket Clearing in Economies with Asymmetric Information”, CMS-EMS Discussion
Paper #1487
Blume, L. E., Bray,M. M., and Easley, D. (1982) : ”Introduction to the stability of
rational expectations equilibrium”, Journal of EconomicTheory 26:313-17
30
Blume, L.E., and Easley,D (1982): ”Learning to be rational”, Journal of Economic
Theory 26:340-51
Bray, M. (1982): ”Learning, estimation and the stability of rational expectations”,
Journal of Economic Theory 26:318-39
Bray, M. (1983): ”Convergence to rational expectations equilibrium”, in Roman
Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps (eds.), Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Out-
comes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Cass, D. and K. Shell (1983): ”Do sunspots matter?”, Journal of Political Economy,
91, 193–227
Chiappori, P.-A. and R. Guesnerie (1988): ”Endogenous Fluctuations under Ratio-
nal Expectations”, European Economic Review, 32, 389–397
Chiappori, P.-A. and R. Guesnerie (1989): ”On Stationary Sunspot Equilibria of
order k”, in Economic Complexity, Chaos, Sunspots, Bubbles and Nonlinearity,
W. Barnett, S. Geweke and K. Shell eds., Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University
Press.
Geanakoplos, J. and H. Polemarchakis (1982): ”We Can’t Disagree Forever”, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 28, 192–200
Guesnerie, R. (1986): ”Stationary Sunspot Equilibria in an n-commodity world”,
Journal of Economic Theory, 40, 103–128
Hommes, C. H. (1998): ”On the Consistency of Backward-looking Expectations:
the case of the cobweb”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 33, 333–
362
Hommes, C.H. and G. Sorger (1998): ”Consistent Expectations Equilibria”, Macroe-
conomic Dynamics, 2, 287–321
Kurz, M. (1994a): ”On Rational Belief Equilibria”, Economic Theory, 4, 859–876
31
Kurz, M. (1994b): ”On the Structure and Diversity of Rational Beliefs”, Economic
Theory, 4, 877–900
Lucas, R.E. (1978): ”Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy”, Econometrica, 46(6),
1249–1445
Lucas, R.E. (1986): ”Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory”, Journal of Busi-
ness, 59(4), S401–S426
McAllister, J. (1990): ”Rational Behavior and Rational Expectations”, Journal of
Economic Theory, 52, 332–363
Morris, S. (1995): ”Justifying Rational Expectations”, CARESS working paper,
1995
Radner, R. (1979): ”Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the
Information Revealed by Prices”, Econometrica, 47, 655–678
Woodford, M. (1990): ”Learning to believe in sunspots”, Econometrica, 58, 277–307
32
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2013/74 Mehdi MADANI and Mathieu VAN VYVE. A new formulation of the European day-ahead 
electricity market problem and its algorithmic consequences. 
2014/1 Erik SCHOKKAERT and Tom TRUYTS. Preferences for redistribution and social structure. 
2014/2 Maarten VAN DIJCK and Tom TRUYTS. The agricultural invasion and the political economy 
of agricultural trade policy in Belgium, 1875-1900. 
2014/3 Ana MAULEON, Nils ROEHL and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Constitutions and social 
networks. 
2014/4 Nicolas CARAYOL, Rémy DELILLE and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Allocating value 
among farsighted players in network formation. 
2014/5 Yu. NESTEROV and Vladimir SHIKHMAN. Convergent subgradient methods for nonsmooth 
convex minimization. 
2014/6 Yuri YATSENKO, Natali HRITONENKO and Thierry BRECHET. Modeling of enrironmental 
adaptation versus pollution mitigation. 
2014/7 Sanjeeb DASH, Oktay GÜNLÜK and Laurence A. WOLSEY. The continuous knapsack set. 
2014/8 Simon BUCKLE, Mirabelle MUÛLS, Joerg LEIB and Thierry BRECHET. Prospects for Paris 
2015: do major emitters want the same climate. 
2014/9 Lionel ARTIGE, Antoine DEDRY and Pierre PESTIEAU. Social security and economic 
integration. 
2014/10 Mikhail ISKAKOV, Alexey ISKAKOV and Alexey ZAKHAROV. Equilibria in secure 
strategies in the Tullock contest. 
2014/11 Helmuth CREMER and Pierre PESTIEAU. Means-tested long term care and family transfers. 
2014/12 Luc BAUWENS, Lyudmila GRIGORYEVA and Juan-Pablo ORTEGA. Estimation and 
empirical performance of non-scalar dynamic conditional correlation models. 
2014/13 Christian M. HAFNER and Arie PREMINGER. A note on the Tobit model in the presence of a 
duration variable. 
2014/14 Jean-François CARPANTIER and Arnaud DUFAYS. Specific Markov-switching behaviour for 
ARMA parameters. 
2014/15 Federico GRIGIS DE STEFANO. Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph. 
2014/16 Claudio TELHA and Mathieu VAN VYVE. Efficient approximation algorithms for the 
economic lot-sizing in continuous time. 
2014/17 Yukai YANG. Testing constancy of the error covariance matrix in vector models against 
parametric alternatives using a spectral decomposition. 
2014/18 Koen DECANCQ, Marc FLEURBAEY and Erik SCHOKKAERT. Inequality, income, and 
well-being. 
2014/19 Paul BELLEFLAMME and Martin PEITZ. Digital piracy: an update. 
2014/20 Eva-Maria SCHOLZ. Licensing to vertically related markets. 
2014/21 N. Baris VARDAR. Optimal energy transition and taxation of non-renewable resources. 
2014/22 Benoît DECERF. Income poverty measures with relative poverty lines. 
2014/23 Antoine DEDRY, Harun ONDER and Pierre PESTIEAU. Aging, social security design and 
capital accumulation. 
2014/24 Biung-Ghi JU and Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO. Fair allocation of disputed properties. 
2014/25 Nguyen Thang DAO. From agriculture to manufacture: How does geography matter ? 
2014/26 Xavier Y. WAUTHY. From Bertrand to Cournot via Kreps and Scheinkman: a hazardous 
journey. 
2014/27 Gustavo BERGANTIÑOS and Juan MORENO-TERNERO. The axiomatic approach to the 
problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing. 
2014/28 Jean HINDRIKS and Yukihiro NISHIMURA. International tax leadership among asymmetric 
countries. 
2014/29 Jean HINDRIKS and Yukihiro NISHIMURA. A note on equilibrium leadership in tax 
competition models. 
2014/30 Olivier BOS and Tom TRUYTS. Auctions with prestige motives. 
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2014/31 Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO and Lars P. ØSTERDAL . Normative foundations for equity-
sensitive population health evaluation functions. 
2014/32 P. Jean-Jacques HERINGS, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Stability of 
networks under Level-K farsightedness. 
2014/33 Lionel ARTIGE, Laurent CAVENAILE and Pierre PESTIEAU. The macroeconomics of PAYG 
pension schemes in an aging society. 
2014/34 Tanguy KEGELART and Mathieu VAN VYVE. A conic optimization approach for SKU 
rationalization. 
2014/35 Ulrike KORNEK, Kei LESSMANN and Henry TULKENS. Transferable and non transferable 
utility implementations of coalitional stability in integrated assessment models. 
2014/36 Ibrahim ABADA, Andreas EHRENMANN and Yves SMEERS. Endogenizing long-term 
contracts in gas market models. 
2014/37 Julio DAVILA. Output externalities on total factor productivity. 
2014/38 Diane PIERRET. Systemic risk and the solvency-liquidity nexus of banks. 
2014/39 Paul BELLEFLAMME and Julien JACQMIN. An economic appraisal of MOOC platforms: 
business models and impacts on higher education. 
2014/40 Marie-Louise LEROUX, Pierre PESTIEAU and Grégory PONTHIERE. Longévité 
différentielle et redistribution: enjeux théoriques et empiriques. 
2014/41 Chiara CANTA, Pierre PESTIEAU and Emmanuel THIBAULT. Long term care and capital 
accumulation: the impact of the State, the market and the family. 
2014/42 Gilles GRANDJEAN, Marco MANTOVANI, Ana MAULEON and Vincent 
VANNETELBOSCH. Whom are you talking with ? An experiment on credibility and 
communication structure. 
2014/43 Julio DAVILA. The rationality of expectations formation. 
 
Books 
 
V. GINSBURGH and S. WEBER (2011), How many languages make sense? The economics of linguistic 
diversity. Princeton University Press. 
I. THOMAS, D. VANNESTE and X. QUERRIAU (2011), Atlas de Belgique – Tome 4 Habitat. Academia 
Press. 
W. GAERTNER and E. SCHOKKAERT (2012), Empirical social choice. Cambridge University Press. 
L. BAUWENS, Ch. HAFNER and S. LAURENT (2012), Handbook of volatility models and their 
applications. Wiley. 
J-C. PRAGER and J. THISSE (2012), Economic geography and the unequal development of regions. 
Routledge. 
M. FLEURBAEY and F. MANIQUET (2012), Equality of opportunity: the economics of responsibility. 
World Scientific. 
J. HINDRIKS (2012), Gestion publique. De Boeck. 
M. FUJITA and J.F. THISSE (2013), Economics of agglomeration: cities, industrial location, and 
globalization. (2nd edition). Cambridge University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS and G.D. MYLES (2013). Intermediate public economics. (2nd edition). MIT Press. 
J. HINDRIKS, G.D. MYLES and N. HASHIMZADE (2013). Solutions manual to accompany intermediate 
public economics. (2nd edition). MIT Press. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 
A. SHAPIRO (2010), Stochastic programming: modeling and theory. 
